DEALING WITH THE IRAQ WAR

Dealing with the Iraq war, there were and remain three strategic objectives.  The first is mentioned in brief only. The psychological components are outlined a little more and form the basis of an article I wrote just after the outbreak of war.  I'll repeat the gist of that article here by way of a review of progress.

First, and the most immediately pressing, the war was initiated to secure the region and its resources and to prevent hostile Muslim nations from embroiling it in war. In this latter event, the consequences to our Western economies would have been disastrous. This objective has been met though more work needs to be done, and Iran remains a problem. Second, the war was conducted to mark out the parameters of Western tolerance to hostile initiatives directed against it throughout the world, it being held to be crucially important that this message be sent to the entire Muslim world and its political divisions (and to the rest of the world for future reference) in the clearest, most unambiguous terms. This objective has been achieved militarily with the assistance of carefully staged theatrical propaganda effects and at a relatively insignificant cost in Western lives. The third objective was, and remains, to separate the Muslim world into two broad predictive categories the better to manage their impact upon the West. Dealing with the third, the first category group is the largest and consists of the broad mass of Muslims across the world. This socially, politically, and ideologically variegated group is not considered a source of direct military resistance or aggression, rather a well from which military/insurgent elements can seep into a different second category group.  Although the need for proactive Western military action against its terrorist brothers in Islam is rationally accepted by most within the first group, there will, nonetheless, develop within the group a negative emotional response to external aggression directed towards its religious and ethnic affiliates. This negative response can be expected to radicalise a proportion of the group's members whilst leaving the larger by far proportion resentful to varying degrees, but nonetheless passive. The second category comprises group elements within the smaller proportion of the Muslim mass, which elements, already radicalised through ideological opposition to Western values, culture, and hegemony, have and will continue form the aggressive and violent group opposition to the West. The subtext to the war addresses the strategic aim of maintaining a functionally clear division between the two groups. The first group will, it is to be expected, become psychologically dispossessed of the will to form or maintain a militarily coherent anti-West posture particularly in terms of its State and other political structures. The already radicalised second group, however, will become increasingly isolated within the political structures of the passive group but can, over time, be neutralised by co-operative and concerted action by the West's client Muslim States and the local Muslim administrations in them. 

An encouraging response is beginning to emerge as a result of pursuing this strategy. This dual approach must now be consolidated, intensified, and aggressively pursued elsewhere in the Middle East , and as quickly as practicability allows. On the home front it's clear that the divide and separate stratagem is producing results. There are encouraging signs that the local 'insurgency' can be separated from the broad mass of British Muslims. The target should be to continue to intensify the pressure on the Muslim community in subtle ways designed to encourage it to distance itself from the insurgents and to assist the security forces where possible.

Prophesy from the Coop

Sic Transit Gloria Mundi  

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